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_________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge 
 Defendant John MacLeod pled guilty to two crimes: 
inducing minors to engage in sexual activity for the purpose of 
producing child pornography, and transporting minors across state 
lines with the intent to engage in sexual activity.  This appeal 
involves the propriety, under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines ("guidelines" or "USSG"), of a district court's upward 
departure based on the large number of victims harmed by the 
defendant.  Under the applicable guideline, USSG § 3D1.4, 
MacLeod's presumptive guideline range was 121-151 months. 
However, this guideline allows only six victims to be taken into 
account in determining the base offense level while MacLeod's 
offense involved at least ten minors.  To punish MacLeod for 
these additional victims, the district court departed upward four 
sentencing levels, making MacLeod's new guidelines range 188 to 
235 months.  The district court sentenced MacLeod to 235 months, 
and he now appeals. 
 In connection with departures, we follow a three step 
review process.  Our review is plenary as to whether departure 
was permissible; clearly erroneous as to whether the facts 
support the grounds relied upon for departure; and deferential as 
to the reasonableness of the departure.  See United States v. 
Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1098 (3d Cir. 1990).  Applying this 
standard, we conclude that the presence of additional, uncounted 
4 
victims is an appropriate basis for upward departure and that the 
facts of record support the district court's decision to depart. 
In evaluating the reasonableness of the departure, we seek 
guidance from the structure of the guidelines themselves.  We 
find it in the commentary to Chapter 3, Part D and in analogy to 
other guidelines sections (as well as case law from other 
circuits).  Because the district court's departure violated the 
principle of "declining marginal punishment" as enunciated in the 
commentary to Chapter 3, Part D, see USSG Ch.3, Pt.D, intro. 
comment., and exceeded the pattern for upward adjustments in both 
the theft and fraud sections of the guidelines, see USSG §§2B1.1, 
2F1.1, we conclude that the extent of the district court's 
departure was unreasonable.  We therefore vacate the judgment and 
remand for resentencing.   
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 A.  The Offense 
 MacLeod, a resident of Silver Spring, Maryland, 
participated with his co-defendant, Eric Nastelin, in a child 
pornography ring from December 1991 to August 1993.  The relevant 
facts are summarized as follows.  
 On August 6, 1993, the mother of a fourteen year old 
boy, V-1, advised the Montgomery County, Maryland Police 
Department that MacLeod had befriended her son and two other 
fourteen year olds, V-2 and V-3.  The mother reported that her 
son would return home from outings with MacLeod with forty to 
fifty dollars in unexplained cash.  She also related that V-1 and 
another boy had confided to her friend, Donald Shipley, that 
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MacLeod had taken "home videos" of them at the Red Roof Inn near 
the BWI Airport and at MacLeod's apartment in Silver Spring, 
Maryland.   
 Based upon this information, Detective John Lyon 
interviewed Shipley.  Shipley explained that over the past 
several months he had driven V-1 and V-2 to a roller rink to meet 
MacLeod.  Both V-1 and V-3 had informed Shipley that MacLeod and 
another male had filmed them having sex.  Maryland law 
enforcement set up surveillance of MacLeod and observed him 
traveling between Silver Spring and the Dundalk area of Baltimore 
several times.  Each time, MacLeod would meet with different 
boys, approximately thirteen to fifteen years old, and drive them 
to various locations including, on one occasion, a Baltimore 
motel.          
 Lyon also interviewed V-1.  V-1 attested to MacLeod's 
involvement with child pornography.  V-1's first sexual encounter 
with MacLeod occurred in December 1992 at the Red Roof Inn where 
MacLeod performed oral sex on V-1.  V-1 was paid forty dollars 
for his participation.  V-3 and V-4 (the brother of V-1, age 
thirteen) were also present.  They were filmed having sex with 
each other by Nastelin.  V-4 was paid $ 250.  
 In January 1992, V-1 made his first sex film for 
MacLeod and Nastelin.  In it, he performed sex acts with V-3. 
Over the next seven months, V-1 made approximately eleven more 
films.  The movies involved him having sex with V-2, V-3, and, on 
one occasion, with his brother, V-4.  The boys were compensated 
for their participation. 
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 On August 21, 1993, MacLeod and Nastelin were arrested 
by agents of the FBI.  Nastelin immediately cooperated by 
providing detailed statements.  He explained that in 1991 he 
began traveling from New Jersey to Baltimore to meet MacLeod at 
various hotels to have sex with boys.  In December 1991, Nastelin 
conceived the idea of filming boys having sex with each other, 
and purchased a video camera for this purpose.  MacLeod approved 
the plan and made the necessary arrangements for boys and for 
hotel rooms.  Approximately twenty films were made in Baltimore. 
After the completion of each film, Nastelin would make copies and 
MacLeod would travel to New Jersey to retrieve one or more of 
them.  Nastelin also stated that, upon MacLeod's suggestion, the 
men stored their large collection of child pornography in a 
storage facility in Lindenwold, New Jersey.0 
 Following MacLeod's arrest, Lyon interviewed V-3.  He 
too confirmed MacLeod's participation in child pornography. 
During 1992 and 1993 MacLeod had sex with V-3 approximately fifty 
times. V-3 also participated in sex movies filmed at MacLeod's 
Silver Spring apartment and various hotels in the Baltimore area. 
Additionally, the FBI interviewed V-5 and V-6, who at the time of 
their sexual relations with MacLeod, were age twelve or thirteen, 
and age fourteen, respectively.  V-5 was featured in an early 
Baltimore film.  On one occasion, MacLeod picked up V-5 and V-6 
                     
0
 The facility contained the following items of child 
pornography: (a) approximately 347 video tapes; (b) approximately 
113 eight millimeter and Super 8 films; (c) approximately 324 
magazines; (d) approximately 954 black and white photographs; (e) 
approximately 232 slides; and (f) books containing visual 
depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.  
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in Baltimore and brought them to a friend's residence in 
Lindenwold. On that trip, MacLeod performed oral sex on V-6 and 
his friend performed oral sex on V-5.  Both boys were paid.  
 A total of ten boys were ultimately identified as 
participants in the Baltimore tapes.  In addition to V-1 through 
V-6, V-7 and V-8 (both under age sixteen), V-9 (age sixteen), and 
V-10 (age seventeen) were identified.  However, several boys 
depicted in the Baltimore tapes and numerous children depicted in 
the Lindenwold storage locker collection remain unidentified.  
 B.  The Indictment and Plea Agreement  
 On March 23, 1994, a federal grand jury returned a 
seven-count indictment against MacLeod.  On June 17, 1994, he 
entered a guilty plea to counts two and seven.  Count two charged 
that from at least as early as December 1991 to on or about 
August 21, 1993, MacLeod "did knowingly and willfully employ, 
use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce individuals under the 
age of 18 years to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the 
purpose of producing child pornography, including videotapes, 
such child pornography having been thereafter transported in 
interstate commerce.  In violation of Title 18, United States 
Code, Sections 2251(a) and 2."  Count seven charged that on or 
about April or May of 1992, MacLeod "did knowingly and willfully 
transport an individual under the age of 18 years, between the 
States of Maryland and New Jersey, with intent to engage in 
sexual activities with the minor which constitutes a criminal 
offense, as set forth in [New Jersey Law].  In violation of Title 
18, United States Code, Sections 2423 and 2."  
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 C.  Sentencing  
 The district court adopted the sentencing 
recommendations of MacLeod's probation officer, and thus we focus 
on the probation officer's report.  Applying the 1993 edition of 
the guidelines, the probation officer concluded that the 
applicable guideline for the pornography production count, 18 
U.S.C. § 2251(a), is USSG § 2G2.1.  That guideline calls for a 
base offense level of 25.  Because the offense involved a minor 
under sixteen years of age, the officer added two levels, see 
USSG § 2G2.1(b)(1), raising MacLeod's offense level to 27. 
 Applying the 1993 edition of the guidelines to the 
transportation of a minor count, 18 U.S.C. § 2423, the probation 
officer concluded that the applicable guideline is USSG § 2G1.2. 
That section specifies a base offense level of 16.  Because the 
offense involved a minor between the ages of twelve and sixteen, 
the probation officer added two levels, see USSG § 2G1.2(b)(3), 
raising the offense level to 18.   
 In order to arrive at a combined offense level for the 
two counts, the probation officer applied the grouping rules of 
Chapter Three, Part D.  Because MacLeod's offenses involved the 
exploitation of more than one minor, the exploitation of each 
minor was treated as if it were a separate count of conviction.0  
                     
0
 USSG § 2G2.1, the guideline applicable to the 
pornography production count, provides that "If the offense 
involved the exploitation of more than one minor, Chapter Three, 
Part D (Multiple Counts) shall be applied as if the exploitation 
of each minor had been contained in a separate count of 
conviction."  USSG § 2G2.1(c).  Likewise, USSG § 2G1.2, the 
guideline applicable to the transportation of a minor count, 
states that "If the offense involved the transportation of more 
9 
These "counts" were not grouped.  See USSG § 3D1.2(d) (stating 
that offenses covered by USSG §§ 2G2.1, 2G1.2 should not be 
grouped).    
 The probation officer then calculated the combined 
offense level for these non-grouped counts.  Under USSG § 
3D1.4,0the combined offense level is determined by taking the 
count with the highest offense level -- here, one of the 
pornography production counts (for which the offense level is 27) 
-- and adding one offense level for each equally serious (or from 
one to four levels less serious) count.  Thus, MacLeod's offense 
level is 27 plus one level for each of the other pornography 
counts. The transportation of a minor counts are irrelevant 
because, at an offense level of 18, they are nine levels less 
serious than the count with the highest offense level.  See USSG 
§ 3D1.4(c) (disregarding any count that is nine levels less 
serious than the count with the highest offense level).  Although 
there were at least ten victims of MacLeod's pornography 
production offense (or rather ten pornography production 
"counts"), § 3D1.4 only allows six victims to be taken into 
account (for an increase of five levels).  The probation officer 
                                                                  
than one person, Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple Counts) shall be 
applied as if the transportation of each person had been 
contained in a separate count of conviction."  USSG § 2G1.2(d).  
0
 While this section speaks of calculating the combined 
offense level for several groups, it also furnishes the 
methodology for calculating the combined offense level of several 
non-grouped counts.  The commentary at the end of Chapter 3, Part 
D offers illustrations.  Example number one applies USSG § 3D1.4 
to determine the combined offense level for four counts not 
grouped under USSG § 3D1.2.  See USSG Ch.3, Pt.D, comment. (n.1).  
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thus added five levels to MacLeod's offense level of 27, 
resulting in an offense level of 32.0 
 Pursuant to USSG §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b), the probation 
officer then lowered MacLeod's offense level by three levels (to 
29) for acceptance of responsibility.  Based on a total offense 
level of 29 and MacLeod's criminal history category of IV, the 
probation officer concluded that the guideline range for 
imprisonment was 121 to 151 months.  See USSG Ch.5, Pt.A.  Under 
USSG § 5K2.0, the sentencing court may depart from this range if 
it finds that "'there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
                     
0
 The probation officer's calculations appeared as 
follows in the presentence report: 
 
Count Two--Use of Minor for Producing Child Pornography 
  
 Adjusted Offense Level (Subtotal):       27 
 
Count Seven--Transportation of a Minor for 
 Purpose of Prohibited Sexual Contact 
 
Adjusted Offense Level (Subtotal):       18 
 
 Multiple Count Adjustment (See Section 3D1.4) 
            Units 
 
 Adjusted Offense Level-Ct. Two-Victim 1  27  1 
 Adjusted Offense Level-Ct. Two-Victim 2  27  1 
 Adjusted Offense Level-Ct. Two-Victim 3  27  1 
 Adjusted Offense Level-Ct. Two-Victim 4  27  1 
 Adjusted Offense Level-Ct. Two-Victim 5  27  1 
 Adjusted Offense Level-Ct. Two-Victim 6  27  1 
 Adjusted Offense Level-Ct. Seven-Victim 1 18  0 
 Adjusted Offense Level-Ct. Seven-Victim 2 18  0 
 Total Number of Units        6 
 Greater Adjusted Offense Level     27 
  Increase in Offense Level      5 
 Combined Adjusted Offense Level         32 
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guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
described.'"  While the probation officer's report did not 
counsel for or against departure, it did suggest that departure 
might be warranted because hundreds of boys were represented in 
MacLeod's collection while he was held accountable for only six 
victims.  
  At the sentencing hearing, the government asked for the 
151 month maximum sentence but took no position on whether an 
upward departure was appropriate.  The district court agreed with 
the sentencing calculations of the probation officer concluding 
that MacLeod's guideline range was 121 to 151 months.  The 
district court further determined that an upward departure was 
appropriate.  The commentary to USSG § 3D1.4 counsels departure 
if after application of the section, the adjustments made are 
inadequate.  USSG § 3D1.4, comment. (backg'd).  According to the 
court, the adjustments were inadequate because they allowed only 
six children to be taken into account while the offense involved 
four additional identified children and many other unidentified 
victims.0  In calculating the appropriate extent of the 
departure, the court made clear that it would count only the four 
identified victims.  United States v. MacLeod, No. 94-131, slip 
                     
0
 When the district court spoke of the minors involved in 
the offense, it was referring only to the minors involved in the 
production of the Baltimore tapes.  See United States v. MacLeod, 
94-131, slip op. 38, 40 (D.N.J. August 26, 1994) ("In fact--
however, [in] those specific tapes, they have identified ten, not 
six victims, and there are unidentified other victims.  Again, 
we're talking about just those so-called -- they refer to [them] 
here as the 'Baltimore tapes.' [We're] not talking about the full 
mass [of materials stored in the Lindenwold locker]."). 
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op. 38, 41 (D.N.J. August 26, 1994) ("I'm not going to count the 
unknown victims, but since we have four known other victims, I'm 
going to add a level for each one, and I'm going to upward 
adjust.").  The court departed upward four levels--one for each 
identified victim--raising MacLeod's offense level to 33.  
 With his category IV criminal history, MacLeod's new 
sentencing range was 188 to 235 months.  The court imposed the 
maximum 235 month sentence because it believed MacLeod had 
dedicated his entire adult life to child pornography.  The 
presentence report stated that MacLeod had abused his own 
children.  The court could see no hope for redemption and thus 
sentenced MacLeod to 120 months imprisonment on count two and 115 
months on count seven, the sentences to be served consecutively 
(for a total of 235 months).  The court also imposed concurrent 
terms of three years supervised release on each count of 
conviction, and directed that MacLeod pay a special assessment of 
$ 100.  
 In this appeal, MacLeod contends that the district 
court's decision to depart was improper, and alternatively, 
assuming that departure was appropriate, that the extent of 
departure was unreasonable.   
II. Analysis 
 In reviewing departures, we follow a three-step 
process.  Our review is plenary as to whether a departure was 
permissible; clearly erroneous as to whether the facts support 
the grounds relied upon for departure; and deferential as to the 
13 
reasonableness of the departure.  See United States v. Kikumura, 
918 F.2d 1084, 1098 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 A. Step One--Was Departure Permissible?  
 A district court may depart from the applicable 
guideline range only if it "finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, 
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described."  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 
Here, the commentary to USSG § 3D1.4 specifically instructs that 
"Inasmuch as the maximum increase provided in the guideline is 5 
levels, departure would be warranted in the unusual case where 
the additional offenses resulted in a total of significantly more 
than 5 units."  USSG § 3D1.4, comment. (backg'd).0  Following 
this commentary, the district court based its decision to depart 
on the existence of additional victims0 not taken into account by 
the five level increase.0  Under step one of our review process, 
we review its decision de novo. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098. 
                     
0
 Under 3D1.2 each offense that is equally serious or 
from one to four levels less serious than the offense with the 
highest level is counted as one "unit."  One level is added for 
each unit.  
0
 Hereinafter, we will use the phrase "additional 
offenses" and "additional victims" interchangeably.   
0
 It is true, as MacLeod argues, that the district court, at 
one point, ambiguously mentioned the "intensity" of the 
defendant's involvement as a reason for departure.  However, when 
such remark is viewed in context, it is clear that the district 
court used the number of victims as the basis for departure. 
United States v. MacLeod, 94-131, slip op. 38, 40-42 (D.N.J. 
August 26, 1994). 
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 We must first determine upon how many additional 
offenses the district court based its decision to depart.  It is 
clear that the district court calculated the extent of its (four 
level) departure using only the four identified, but uncounted, 
children in the Baltimore tapes.  See discussion supra page 11. 
However, the district court's threshold decision to depart was 
based on the identified as well as unidentified children in the 
Baltimore tapes.0  We do not know the exact number of 
unidentified children as the presentence report simply states 
that, "There were several other boys in [the Baltimore tapes] 
that were unable to be identified." (emphasis added).  Giving 
"several" its ordinary meaning would suggest that there were, 
perhaps, three unidentified boys.  This would bring the total of 
uncounted children in the Baltimore tapes (and the number of 
additional offenses upon which the district court relied) to 
seven (four identified boys plus three unidentified children).0 
 We need not be concerned, however, about our inability 
to determine the exact number of additional offenses upon which 
the district court relied.  The district court relied on at least 
four additional offenses, and four uncounted victims makes this 
                     
0
 Id. at 41 ("I find that an adjustment of five based on 
six victims, where there are four known, ten victims, and a 
larger number of unknown victims, the unknown only because they 
can't be identified, that a further upward adjustment is 
required.").  
0
 Indeed, without explanation, the government asserts, in 
its brief, that there were seven or eight uncounted boys in the 
Baltimore tapes.  Appellee's Brief at 14-15.    
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an "unusual case" resulting in a total of "significantly more 
than five units."0  We reach this conclusion for several reasons.  
 First, assuming that the district court based its 
decision to depart on only four additional victims, this means 
that nearly half of MacLeod's ten victims were not considered. 
When close to half of a defendant's crimes may go unpunished, we 
consider this significant and worthy of departure. 
 Furthermore, in determining whether, under § 3D1.4, a 
case is an "unusual case" where the "additional offenses resulted 
in significantly more than five units," one may consider not only 
the numerical difference between the six victims considered and 
the actual number of victims involved, but also the nature of the 
additional criminal conduct.  See United States v. Pearson, 911 
F.2d 186, 189 (9th Cir. 1990) (indicating that it is permissible 
to take into account nature as well as number of additional 
offenses in deciding whether to depart in accordance with 
commentary to USSG § 3D1.4).  In the present case, MacLeod's four 
additional offenses involved the sexual exploitation of young 
children.  Two of the victims (V-7 and V-8) were under the age of 
sixteen.  A third and fourth victim (V-9 and V-10) were only 
sixteen and seventeen respectively.  Given the potential 
psychological harm to the young victims of this type of offense, 
we believe that the addition of (at a minimum) four victims 
                     
0
 Obviously, if four additional offenses are significant, 
five, six, or seven additional offenses would be significant as 
well. 
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should be considered significant, and hence that upward departure 
was permissible. 
 Other courts that have addressed the issue also support 
this conclusion.  Only three published opinions (involving three 
different United States Courts of Appeals), deal with USSG §3D1.4 
departures for numerous offenses.  See United States v. Okane, 52 
F.3d 828 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pearson, 911 F.2d 186 
(9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Chase, 894 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 
1990).  Under plenary review (and with little comment), the Chase 
court found 9 uncounted robberies significant0 while the Okane 
court found five uncounted robberies significant.0  Under abuse 
                     
0
 United States v. Chase, 894 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 
1990) ("We find the instant case to be one in which the 
additional offenses (numbering nine) resulted in a total of 
significantly more than five units.  Without question, the 
circumstance relied upon by the district court to justify 
departure from the Guidelines -- the large additional number of 
bank robberies committed by the defendant -- is sufficiently 
'unusual' to justify departure."). 
0
 United States v. Okane, 52 F.3d 828, 832-33 (10th Cir. 
1995) ("We have no trouble concluding Mr. Okane's pleas of guilty 
to five additional bank robbery charges, which did not amount to 
additional units under § 3D1.4, nonetheless constitute 
sufficiently unusual circumstances to support an upward departure 
under step one.  Under similar circumstances involving a 
defendant who pled guilty to fifteen counts of robbery, only five 
of which were expressly counted as units under § 3D1.4, the First 
Circuit [in Chase] stated '[w]ithout question, the circumstance 
relied on by the district court [i.e., the remaining ten robbery 
convictions] to justify departure from the Guidelines -- the 
large additional number of bank robberies committed by the 
defendant -- is sufficiently "unusual" to justify a departure.'") 
(citation omitted). 
  It is worth noting that we believe that the Okane 
court, in some respects, misapplied § 3D1.4.  While that section 
allows for only a five level increase in offense level, it 
actually takes into account six victims.  Thus, the Chase court 
used nine (not ten) uncounted robberies as the basis for its 
departure. Likewise, as the defendant in Okane pled guilty to ten 
bank robberies, the five level increase in § 3D1.4 accounted for 
17 
of discretion review, the Pearson court considered two uncounted 
robberies significant. 911 F.2d at 189-90.0     
 B. Step Two--Do the Facts Support the Grounds Relied 
Upon for Departure? 
   The district court based its decision to depart on 
the uncounted minors depicted in the Baltimore tapes.  Under step 
two, we review for clear error whether the record contains a 
sufficient factual basis to support departure.  See Kikumura, 918 
F.2d 1098.  Pursuant to § 3D1.4, only six of MacLeod's victims 
were used to calculate his presumptive sentence.  The presentence 
report makes clear that the Baltimore tapes involved the 
exploitation of at least ten identified victims as well as 
several unidentified victims.  MacLeod plead guilty to the 
production of the Baltimore tapes.  Thus, there is no question 
that his offense involved a significant number of additional 
uncounted minors.  Accordingly, the district court's 
determination that the facts on record supported its ground for 
departure was not clearly erroneous.   
 C. Step 3--Was the Extent of Departure Reasonable? 
 Finally, we must determine whether the extent of the 
district court's departure -- four levels for four additional 
                                                                  
six of them.  Hence, there should have been four (not five) 
uncounted robberies upon which the Okane court could base its 
departure.    
0
 Unlike this Court, The Ninth Circuit follows a five 
step review process for departures.  Under this five step 
process, an assessment of the significance of the additional 
offenses falls under abuse of discretion review.  United States 
v. Pearson, 911 F.2d 186, 188-89 (9th Cir 1990). 
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offenses -- was reasonable.0  We review the court's determination 
for abuse of discretion.  See Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1098.  We find 
it useful to begin our discussion with a simple mathematical 
analysis.  Had the district court considered only one victim, 
MacLeod's total offense level would have been 24 and his 
guideline range would have been seventy-seven to ninety-six 
months rather than 121 to 151 months (the range applicable after 
the five level increase of § 3D1.4).  Thus, the first five 
additional victims raised MacLeod's term of imprisonment by 
fifty-five months (151 minus ninety-six).  The average increment 
per additional offense was eleven months (fifty-five divided by 
five).  When the district court departed an additional four 
levels for the four uncounted victims, MacLeod's guideline range 
became 188 to 235 months.  Thus, these four victims raised 
MacLeod's sentence eighty-four months (235 minus 151) or twenty-
one months per victim (eighty-four divided by four).         
 In evaluating the reasonableness of the district 
court's departure, we seek guidance from the guidelines 
themselves.  See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1111 ("Recognizing the 
need for additional standards, the courts of appeals have 
recently begun to look to the guidelines themselves for guidance 
in determining the reasonableness of a departure.  Today we 
endorse that general approach.") (citations omitted).  When 
departing from a sentencing range, courts should remain faithful 
                     
0
 The district court was clear that the extent of its 
departure was based only on the four identified victims.  See 
discussion supra p. 11. 
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to structured guideline principles and attempt, where possible, 
to create sentences analogous to those explicitly specified by 
the guidelines for similar offenses.  We note that at higher 
sentencing ranges, where MacLeod's sentence falls, an increase of 
one level generally makes a quite large and continually 
increasing amount of jail time.  Thus, we must consider with 
extreme care the district court's decision to depart four levels. 
 MacLeod's offense involved Chapter 3, Part D of the 
sentencing guidelines.  The introductory commentary to that part 
indicates that its aim is "provide incremental punishment for 
significant additional criminal conduct."  USSG Ch.3, Pt.D, 
intro. comment.  However, "the amount of additional punishment 
[is to] decline[ ] as the number of offenses increase."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  The district court's departure is at odds with 
this principle of declining marginal punishment.  MacLeod's first 
five additional offenses carried an average of eleven additional 
months imprisonment.  Given the district court's departure, 
MacLeod's final four offenses carried an average of twenty-one 
additional months imprisonment.  Thus, contrary to the commentary 
to Section 3, Part D, as the number of MacLeod's offenses 
increased, so did his additional punishment.  
 An examination of the guideline sections pertaining to 
both theft and fraud also suggest that the extent of the district 
court's departure was problematic.  These sections are a good 
source of comparison because they permit, without departure, an 
offense to be increased beyond five levels (the limit imposed for 
grouping increments in § 3D1.4).  Especially as one gets beyond 
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an increase of five offense levels, each one level increase 
requires a growing amount of harm.  For instance under USSG 
§2B1.1, the guideline involving theft, embezzlement and receipt 
of stolen property, raising a five level increase to a six level 
increase requires $10,000 more loss.  Raising a six level 
increase to a seven level increase requires $20,000 more loss. 
Raising a nine level increase to a ten level increase requires 
$80,000 more loss.  At the extreme, raising a nineteen level 
increase to a twenty level increase requires $40,000,000 more 
loss.  USSG § 2F1.1, the guideline for fraud and deceit, forgery, 
and counterfeiting, follow a similar pattern.  Yet, in the 
instant case, each level of the district court's four level 
departure was based on the same amount of harm--the exploitation 
of one child.  Analogy to USSG §§ 2B1.1, 2F1.1 suggests that this 
is unreasonable. 
 The three court of appeals cases in this area support 
our decision.  In the two cases that found a departure 
unreasonable, the departure was significantly lower than it is 
here.  In United States v. Okane, 52 F.3d 828 (10th Cir. 1995), 
the court upheld a departure of one level for five additional 
bank robberies.  The court wrote: 
 We find the district court's proffered 
reason for departing, which was Mr. Okane's 
additional pleas of guilty to five other 
robbery charges, is legally sufficient to 
warrant a one level upward departure. . . . 
 While the Guidelines' overarching 
purpose of achieving uniformity and 
proportionality in sentencing is a 
countervailing concern in this calculus, the 
Guidelines do contemplate some sentencing 
disparities in cases where the circumstances 
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justify it.  The Guidelines do not prohibit 
any sentencing disparity; they prohibit 
unwarranted sentencing disparities.  In this 
case, the offenses in question are 
undoubtedly serious and we find they warrant 
a one-level departure.  
Id. at 833 (citations omitted).  Thus, in Okane, the court found 
reasonable a much smaller departure than the one here at issue.   
 In United States v. Chase, 894 F.2d 490, 491-92 (1st 
Cir. 1990), the First Circuit affirmed a departure of 
approximately fifty months for nine additional bank robberies. 
Dividing fifty months by nine robberies indicates that the 
average additional imprisonment time for each robbery was 
approximately five and one-half months.  As this was roughly 
equivalent to the additional punishment, under the guidelines, 
for each of the first five additional offenses, the court upheld 
the departure.  Id.  In the case at bar, the district court 
departed eighty-four months for four additional offenses.  This 
resulted in an average of twenty-one additional months 
imprisonment per offense.  In contrast to the departure found 
reasonable by the Chase court, this is approximately double the 
average punishment for the first five additional victims (eleven 
months).   
 In the one case that found the district court's 
departure unreasonable -- United States v. Pearson, 911 F.2d 186, 
190 (9th Cir. 1990) -- the district court's departure, 
approximately fifty-seven months for two offenses (or twenty-
eight and one-half months per offense), id. at 187, closely 
approximates the district court's departure here.  The Ninth 
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Circuit had little difficulty in concluding that the district 
court's six level departure was unreasonable and that a one level 
departure would be appropriate instead.  Id. at 190-91. 
 We appreciate the district court's dilemma here.  With 
no previous guidance from this Court, it was obliged to sentence 
truly repugnant criminal behavior.  Its decision to depart was 
certainly appropriate.  However, for the reasons set forth above, 
the extent of its departure is inconsistent with the exercise of 
sound discretion. 
 The commentary to Chapter 3, Part D indicates that the 
amount of additional punishment should decline as the number of 
offenses increase.  See USSG Ch.3, Pt.D, intro. comment.  Thus, 
the average punishment for the four additional offenses should be 
somewhat less than eleven months (the average punishment for the 
first five additional offenses).  An appropriate departure, 
therefore, should be no more than two levels.  Under such a 
departure, MacLeod's new sentencing range would be 151-188 
months.  A sentence at the upper-end of that range would be a 
thirty-seven month increase from the original 121 to 151 month 
guideline (188 minus 151).  Dividing thirty-seven by four 
indicates an addition of approximately nine months imprisonment 
per offense.  A departure of greater magnitude is unreasonable.0 
                     
0
 While we will not impose an explicit upward limit on 
the district court's ability to depart, should it decide on 
remand to take into account more than the four identified 
victims, we do note that the court should remain faithful to the 
general principles enunciated in this opinion.    
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The judgment of the district court will therefore be vacated and 
the case remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.  
